U.S. intelligence agencies have struggled with “inconsistencies” in their analysis and a “lack of consensus” on the nature of the threat in the weeks leading up to the January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill uprising, according to a Canadian Homeland Security (CSIS) report.
This July 2021 information note – received from CBC News through a request for access to information – also says that as CSIS pursues the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) in Canada, it faces many of the same challenges facing which her colleagues in the United States faced before the uprising.
The July 2021 information note includes summaries prepared by CSIS staff on the US Senate report on the January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill attack and the US National Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
The report also includes CSIS observations on the event, which were to be shared with senior officials in the public security, defense, immigration and justice departments.
Responding to reports from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to U.S. lawmakers, CSIS said there were “discrepancies between and within intelligence products that led to a lack of consensus on the severity of the Jan. 6 threat.” .
CSIS summaries point to the problems the FBI and DHS have experienced in trying to prepare for an attack on the Capitol by a mob of supporters of outgoing President Donald Trump.
CSIS said these problems include recognizing the intent of potential threats, distinguishing protected freedom of expression from credible threats of violence, gaining legal access to private or closed social media platforms, and gaining access to encrypted channels used by IMVE individuals. threatening violence.
“CSIS faces many of the same investigative challenges as its American counterparts in this area,” the document said.
“These considerations reinforce the importance of CSIS’s efforts to modernize and maximize its power as part of Canada’s and Allies’ efforts to counter violent extremism.
A truck driver was sprayed while police banned protesters near Parliament Hill on February 19, 2022 (Evan Mitsui / CBC)
The CSIS defines IMVE as extremism motivated by “a series of complaints and ideas from across the traditional ideological spectrum”.
“As a result, the worldview consists of a personalized narrative that focuses on an extremist’s willingness to incite, allow, and / or mobilize for violence,” the CSIS website said.
Challenges raised in the briefing led a national security expert to question how seriously the intelligence and law enforcement community took the Freedom Convoy event before protesters opposing vaccine mandates occupied the center of Ottawa for weeks in February. .
“Where they seem to have fallen in the United States, there seems to be conflicting and inconsistent advice,” said Stephanie Carvin, a former federal national security analyst who now teaches at Carlton University.
“I don’t know about CSIS, but it was a community problem that we had here in Canada that some agencies recognized and others didn’t, and it was [the Ottawa Police Service] getting consistent advice? That would be something I would be interested to know. “
Gaps in intelligence sharing
What the spy agency saw and passed on to the police, and how the police responded to this information, is likely to be examined more closely through a recently announced public inquiry and special joint commission reviewing the federal government’s decision to invoke the Emergency Act. to clear the occupation of the convoy.
The 2021 information note marks a corner of the investigation and the commission may want to investigate: the continuing gaps in intelligence sharing between CSIS and the police.
“CSIS continues to address the challenges of sharing classified intelligence to inform law enforcement actions while protecting against harmful disclosure,” the briefing said.
Carvin said the real question may be whether the authorities have failed to turn CSIS warnings and advice into action.
“It seems quite clear that our intelligence services seem to have understood what lies ahead. This is the main difference, in my opinion [the] convoy and January 6, “she said.
“It seems that the service gave a briefing at the center before that happened, so why hasn’t this intelligence become better training and advice?”
CSIS Director David Vinho holds a press conference at Parliament Hill in Ottawa on Thursday, July 16, 2020 (Sean Kilpatrick / The Canadian Press)
A CSIS spokesman said he could not confirm or deny the specifics of his investigations, operational interests, methodologies or activities.
“In view of this, I would like to emphasize that the definition of threats, as set out in the CSIS Act, explicitly excludes lawful protest and disagreement,” said Brandon Champagne.
“CSIS works closely with its security and intelligence partners, including by sharing the necessary information with law enforcement to ensure public safety.”
In an information note, CSIS says that in order to better monitor IMVE, it is seeking an update to the Canadian Security Service Act.
“In order to fulfill our mandate to investigate IMVE, advise the government and take measures to reduce the threat, CSIS must have the tools to identify and disrupt threats in this data-rich and rapid threat environment, while meets Canadians’ expectations of confidentiality, “the document said.
Chris Parsons, a senior fellow at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, said it was nearly impossible to determine whether CSIS had adequate powers now or how it was implementing them.
“I don’t think CSIS is transparent enough to know the answer to that,” he said.
“But I think there has to be a culture when we give these powers to national security, as well as to law enforcement officials, they have to be required to provide some kind of annual report on how they use them and the efficiency of their use.”
He also said he wondered why the CSIS did not express concerns about investigating ideologically motivated violent extremism when the government passed updated national security legislation in 2019.
“This is a bit shocking, considering that CSIS did not understand what it wanted or ultimately decided that it wanted the first bite of the apple and then took another bite,” he said.
Earlier this week, CSIS Director David Vinho told a committee of lawmakers and senators that his resources would increasingly investigate IMVE.
“We are constantly monitoring the movement of ideologically motivated violent extremists, so we have a pretty good understanding of the dynamics of the game,” he said.
Sharing information with banks
CSIS officials, who wrote the briefing note, also said that the section of the Canadian Security Service Act that prevents it from sharing classified threat information with non-governmental partners undermines its work.
“… Section 19 of the CSIS Act does not allow CSIS to share classified threat information with non-governmental partners, including financial institutions, which poses challenges to how the Office can support efforts to curb terrorist financing,” the statement said. briefing.
Parsons said there was a risk that CSIS would misclassify people as terrorists or claim to be involved in activities contrary to Canadian interests, and then pass that information on to banks and other institutions.
“This could be one thing if you are chasing people who will drive to the prime minister’s house and try to shoot him. But there are many other groups that have been drawn to CSIS that probably don’t deserve it or certainly don’t believe they do, “he said.
In addition to opening up its legislation, there are a number of policy changes that may change the way CSIS responds to IMVE.
Police in riot gear storm a rally in central Ottawa on February 19, 2022. (Evan Mitsui / CBC)
In an information note, CSIS says it is also monitoring the ongoing negotiations on the CLOUD Act between Ottawa and the United States. U.S. law allows law enforcement agencies to compel U.S.-based technology companies (by order or subpoena) to provide requested data stored on their servers, whether the data is stored in the United States or abroad.
If Canada joins, CSIS could theoretically gain faster access to data stored by Google, Apple, Facebook and other major online players.
WATCH: How the convoy protest paralyzed Ottawa
The convoy and the questions: How a protest paralyzed a capital
The Fifth Estate will show how months of planning, some covert but many in the open, draw convoys to the Canadian capital, leading to an unprecedented one-week occupation of part of Ottawa. 44:50
The agency also said it is closely monitoring the government’s efforts to pass legislation on online damages, which may require regulated online entities such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and TikTok to tag content that poses national security concerns to the CSIS.
“CSIS will continue to work with Canadian government partners on government policy initiatives and will take every opportunity to strengthen the tools to respond to this dynamic threat,” the briefing said.
Carvin said Canada, like some of its allies, needs to regularly update the powers and authority given to security agencies such as CSIS to keep them up to date with emerging technologies and privacy concerns.
“How do we want our security services to get involved online?” Because I think if you ask most Canadians, “Do you want CSIS to surf the Internet randomly looking for bad things,” the answer is no, and I think that’s probably the right answer, “she said.
“But parliament must act.”
Add Comment