There is much to be praised in the West’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Deliveries of deadly military aid and harsh economic sanctions imposed on Russia are welcome and vital. Along with the fierce defensive reaction of the Ukrainians themselves, these measures are already helping to deny Putin’s victory. But there are some worrying signs that the severity of the crisis and its consequences for our behavior are not yet fully understood.
There is widespread debate about possible escalation, in particular Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This, of course, is a great concern. But what needs more attention is the danger inherent in the underlying structure of the crisis itself.
Perhaps the only important factor shaping the outcome of crises between nuclear armed adversaries is the balance of interests at stake. And from the point of view of crisis management, the more asymmetries of interest there are, the easier it is to steer the crisis towards a safe outcome. The crises in Berlin in 1961 and in Cuba in 1962 seem instructive in this regard.
In Berlin, although Soviet and Western forces confronted each other, Western forces eventually agreed to build the wall. They acknowledged that the Soviets, concerned that the expulsion of people leaving the GDR could undermine the viability of the East German state and cause the collapse of Soviet control over all of Eastern Europe, had interests at stake that clouded Western interests in freedom of movement. in the city.
In Cuba, the roles were reversed. The presence of missiles on the island was not central to Soviet interests. For politicians in Washington, on the other hand, they were seen as a direct threat to US national security. The subsequent blockade of Cuba was enough to make the Soviets back down.
The danger inherent in the current crisis is that there is no obvious asymmetry of interests between opponents. Putin was wrong to believe that there was one and now he has renounced that belief. As a result, we are in a crisis in which both sides believe that the main interests are at stake, and both show determination, and it seems that both are willing to take calculated risks to force the other to do what they want. . This is the most difficult and dangerous kind of governance crisis, and the main reason this crisis is as dangerous, if not more so, than Cuba.
The consequences have not sunk in three important areas.
First, the concern about a possible escalation of funds does not outweigh the concern about a possible escalation of targets. If both sides formulate their goals in ways that are seen as a direct threat to the other’s vital interests, it is more likely that both are willing to escalate rather than accept defeat. The conclusion from politics is that in a crisis like this, restraint is just as important as determination.
Our central goals must be to ensure that the Russian invasion of Ukraine fails; that Ukraine has the capacity to defend itself vigorously and not be forced to negotiate from a weakness; and that the European security order remains intact. It is not about destroying the Russian army, seeking a regime change in Moscow, or Ukraine’s accession to NATO (unless its own government and people want it and existing NATO members agree).
Second, there is insufficient emphasis on measures to maintain control over events. Deliberate decisions by opponents to take military action against each other are only part of the danger. Avoiding involuntary violence is just as important.
Military rules for participation need to be reviewed and tightened to ensure that they serve the purpose of crisis management and are not left too open to the local commander’s interpretation. It would be prudent to place more national military assets under NATO’s joint command to ensure greater consistency in control of the military position and operations. And because small allies can and sometimes do involve older ones in wars, the United States must exercise maximum leadership over its allies to ensure that they are all part of the same coherent strategy and that no single member can take action. with dangerous consequences for others.
Third, the recent fiasco of US intelligence officers revealing their role in targeting Russian military assets in Ukraine shows that crisis communications are insufficiently covered. Not only must Western goals be limited and clear, they must also be communicated clearly and consistently so that they are understood and not misunderstood in Moscow. Too many people from too many governments describe current Western goals in different ways: the US Secretary of Defense speaks of Russia’s “weakening”, the British Foreign Secretary speaks of Russia’s expulsion entirely from Ukraine, including Crimea.
The goal of crisis management must be both to protect our vital interests and to avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia. The measures just outlined are not enough to achieve this goal, but they are needed now.
Malcolm Rifkind and Dr. Ian Kearns are members of the ELN board.
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